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LOAN DOLLARIZATION IN V4 COUNTRIES 
Radek Bednařík 
ABSTRACT 
This paper deals with loans dollarization of V4 countries residents, its 
development and sectoral composition. By conducting simple OLS regression 
for each V4 country tries to find out some factors that may have been 
contributing to dollarized loans development.  
ABSTRAKT 
Tento příspěvek se zabývá dolarizací úvěrů rezidentů zemí V4, jejího vývoje a 
sektorovým složením. Pomocí jednoduché OLS regrese se snaží určit některé 
faktory, které mohly přispívat k vývoji dolarizovaných úvěrů. 
Introduction 
The dollarization is a phenomenon, which has begun to be discussed mainly in 
the nineties of the last century. Many papers have been written about it, or more 
precisely, about its various forms. Dollarization, either in its official form (official 
replacement of former currency by the new one) or in an unofficial form 
(simultaneous and widespread using of, at least, two currencies in the economy), 
indeed places some constraints on the economy and brings significant risks as well. 
One can say that the full dollarization issues are well mapped and described in 
various papers, see, for example, Sturzenegger – Levy Yeyati (2003), Berg – 
Borenzstein  (2000), Jílek (2004) or Bednařík (2006). Recently, many papers have 
been written about de facto form of dollarization, since it is really widespread and 
may bring some serious risks, especially to emerging or developing economies. See, 
for example, Ize – Levy Yeyati (1998, 2005) or Leiderman, Maino and Parrado 
(2006). The brief characterization of dollarization forms will be done in the first 
section of this paper. 
This paper deals with dollarization, but in slightly different way than most of 
other papers do. We focus on dollarization of loans in V4 countries. The goal of this 
paper is to show development and composition of foreign exchange loans (that is, 
dollarized loans) in these countries. The reason is, that V4 countries have been 
experiencing steady growth of dollarized loans recently, which may pose a threat to 
debtors (especially households) and therefore to creditors (banks) as well. Also, we 
try to find out whether some selected factors have contributed to the development of 
dollarized loans. This will be done by simple OLS regression for each V4 country 
separately and the results are presented in the third section.  
In the conclusion we summarize the findings of this paper. 
1. What is the dollarization? 
Dollarization is nothing more than a currency substitution, either done officially 
by authorities or spontaneously by agents in the economy. The former is called full 
(official) dollarization and the latter de facto (unofficial) dollarization. The newly 
adopted currency does not have to be only the dollar, but any other foreign currency, 
which is seen to be suitable for adopting by country authorities1. 
Full dollarization is recommended for countries, which suffer from long-run 
high and volatile inflation and from frequent breaches of peg. The former domestic 
currency ceases to exist. Adopting strong and stable currency may help stabilizing 
economy and as a final result, economy welfare should grow. Main pros of full 
dollarization are: stable and low inflation, stable nominal (and real) exchange rate, 
reduction of the interest rate differential, reduction of the speculative capital flows, 
deepening of trade integration with country whose currency is being adopted, 
lowering of the exchange rate risk and therefore lowering of the costs of external debt 
servicing2. However, as always, there are some negative effects of this monetary 
regime. The full dollarization means, that own (and, theoretically independent) 
monetary policy ceases to exist with all known negative effects3. Another problem, 
especially in developing economies, is the loss of seignorage income, which is, in 
fact, income of state budget. And the last one is the loss of lender-of-last-resort 
function. The carrier of this function is mostly the central bank, and when the former 
currency is disbanded, it may provide liquidity support to commercial bank only up to 
its foreign currency reserves4.  Because of aforementioned cons, the full dollarization 
was conducted only in few countries. As relatively fresh examples can be named 
Ecuador (2001) or El Salvador (2000) that switched to dollar in order to solve their 
serious and long-run problems with inflation and unstable nominal exchange rate5. 
De facto dollarization marks the situation, when, at least, two currencies are 
widely used in the economy. Agents switch to other currencies, because they want to 
hedge themselves against high and unstable inflation and unstable nominal 
exchange rate. In such kind of environment, the purchasing power of domestic 
currency is unstable and low, which brings uncertainty to agents. De facto 
dollarization has many forms, but most attention is paid to its financial form, because 
it may cause serious problems to domestic banking sector, and to whole economy as 
well, in case of some economic problems (economic slowdown or crisis, for 
example)6. This can be shown very easily. Imagine, that lot of domestic residents 
(especially households) have their loans (liabilities) denominated in foreign currency. 
But their income is in domestic currency. Now, when, for some reasons, the nominal 
                                            
1
 The situation of (un)officially replacing currencies is called “dollarization” since the official 
replacement of former and weak currency by dollar was proposed by some economists to some Latin 
America countries. This monetary reform should have helped to stabilize and improve the often very 
unpleasant economic situation of these countries, which had problems with long-run unstable and high 
inflation and unstable (nominal) exchange rate. 
2
 For more detailed description of possible pros and cons of full dollarization ,see, for example, 
Bednařík (2006). 
3
 However, in strongly de facto dollarized country, the independent monetary policy exists only 
formally, since central bank can not manipulate „freely“ with primary interest rate or with exchange 
rate, because the consequent changes of (or pressures on) exchange rate may render foreign 
exchange debtors unable to pay their liabilities. 
4
 In other words, central bank cannot “print money” which is, in fact, good, with respect to low 
inflation. 
5
 The list of fully dollarized countries can be found in Jílek (2004, p.645) 
6
 We may distinct between financial, real, payments, domestic and external dollarization. See 
Gulde et al. (2004). 
exchange rate depreciates or is devaluated, the volume of their foreign exchange 
liabilities expressed in domestic currency will rise, but the amount of their income 
remains the same. Or, since the interest rates of foreign exchange loans are derived 
from primary (repo) interest rates of foreign central banks, the raising of these rates 
will make the foreign exchange loans more expensive. All of this may cause that 
debtors may become to be unable to service their debts, and this will cause problems 
to creditors (banks), due to surge of nonperforming loans. Since banks will 
experience economical problems, their clients may begin to doubt about banks’ 
soundness and runs may appear7. 
From the text above, one can see, why may excessive providing of foreign 
exchange loans be very dangerous, especially in developing or emerging economies. 
Not only it can endanger stability of certain sectors of economy (households namely) 
but it may lower the efficiency of domestic monetary policy, just because the changes 
of official primary interest rate will not influence the cost of foreign exchange loans 
and therefore the inflation controlling ability of central bank through the loan channel 
may be weakened8. 
2. Data and methodology 
Before we turn to FX loans analysis itself, let us say something brief about 
data and methodology used for regression analysis. 
2.1. Data 
In this paper, the following monthly time series are used: FX loans and FX 
deposits of residents, FX loans’ interest rates, inflation (annual rate of change) and 
nominal effective exchange rate. 
All data about FX loans and their structure, FX deposits and about FX loans’ 
interest rates were taken from national central banks. Unfortunately, since each 
country’s central bank publish time series with various lengths, the time coverage for 
each country will differ. However, all monetary and banking statistics are harmonized, 
which ensure that data are comparable. Loans are denominated in millions of euro. 
Data were converted from national currencies to euro using yearly average of 
nominal exchange rate of domestic currency to euro of year 2006. Interest rates of 
FX loans presented in this paper are weighted averages of households’ (incl. NISH) 
and nonfinancial corporations’ FX loans interested rates9. 
Other times series used for regressions are taken from the Eurostat to ensure 
that data were computed by the same methodology. 
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 This happened, for example, in Ecuador during the crisis in the late of nineties. See 
Beckerman (2001) or Jacome H. (2004). 
8
 But, by manipulating with its primary rate, central bank can (theoretically) influence the 
growth of foreign exchange loans, at least, indirectly, because agents, when deciding whether to take 
foreign exchange or domestic currency denominated loan, may be influenced by interest rate 
differential. Simply, when foreign exchange loans are more costly, domestic currency loans may be 
preferred.  
9
 Households and nonfinancial corporations are only sectors, for whom the FX loans’ interest 
rates are published by V4 countries’ central banks. Volumes of these sectors’ FX loans were used as 
weights. NISH means nonprofit institutions serving households. 
2.2. Methodology 
The common regression function for each country is specified as: 
LOGFLt = α1t  + α2t*LOGFDt + α3t*LOGINFt + α4t*LOGNEERt + α5t*LOGIRt + εt, (1)  
t = 1, 2, 3, 4, 
where: FL is FX loans (mil. EUR), FD are FX deposits (mil. EUR), INF is 
inflation (%, annual rate of change), IR is FX loans’ interest rate (%),α1 is constant 
and ε
 
is error term. All variables were converted to logarithms. 
Because unit root testing shows that all time series are non-stationary (thus, 
integrated of order 1), we had to difference them. Differencing results in following 
function: 
DLOGFLt = α1t + α2t*DLOGFDt + α3t*DLOGINFt + α4t*DLOGNEERt + α5t*DLOGIRt + εt. (2) 
What kind of theoretical relationships between regressors and regressand can 
be expected? 
FD – when FX deposits of residents grow, the FX loans may grow too, 
because agents may be more willing to take a new FX loans. This variable serves us 
as some kind of proxy of residents’ foreign currency denominated wealth. However, 
we must say, that between FX deposits and loans may be two-way relationship. 
Because, not only can FX deposits influence FX loans, but FX loans may influence 
FX deposits as well, simply because when agent receives loan, it may be put onto his 
(current) account, raising the volume of FX deposits artificially. If this is a case, the 
usual OLS regression with one function can not yield proper results10. 
INF – inflation is marked as one of the main sources of high de facto 
dollarization in the economy. A lot of papers assume that high inflation supports de 
facto dollarizing by agents’ efforts to hedge against it and it is measured as FX 
deposits / total deposits ratio. In other words, high inflation causes FX deposits to 
grow. Indeed, inflation may support FX loans’ growth as well, but for different 
reasons. High inflation lowers real interest rate paid by debtors and therefore they 
may be willing to take more FX loans. And, of course, high inflation erodes the real 
value of domestic currency loans in term of purchasing power, possibly making FX 
loans more attractive. 
NEER – the nominal effective exchange rate is used, because we were unable 
to obtain exact currency structure of FX loans. Therefore, the NEER may be better 
option in order to capture the possible effects of nominal exchange rates of various 
currencies on FX (dollarized) loans. There can be two (ambiguous) effects. First, 
when NEER appreciates, agents may be willing to take fewer FX loans, because their 
volume, expressed in domestic currency, shrinks (and vice versa). Second, some 
agents may be willing to take more FX loans when NEER appreciates (and vice 
versa). The reason is that if their income is domestic currency denominated, the 
appreciation of NEER means lower risk to them, in terms of debt servicing. In other 
words, they may feel safer and more stimulated when deciding whether to take FX 
loan or not. 
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 However, we tested this possible two-way relationship in all examined countries by Granger 
causality test, and did not find any strong results supporting this relationship. 
IR – here, the theoretical relationship is simple. When FX loans’ interest rate 
grows, agents are less willing to take FX loans and vice versa11.  
3. Loan dollarization in V4 countries 
In this section, we will first look at FX loans development and structure. 
Second, we will present the results of OLS regressions, for each country separately. 
3.1. Foreign currency loans development and structure 
Seeing Fig. 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, we can immediately see distinct differences 
between V4 countries and make some conclusions12.  
3.1.1. Czech republic 
One can see, that in the 10 year period, for which the data are available, FX 
loans volume followed really nice cyclical path. The amount of FX loans reached a 
peak in 1999 (almost 9000 mil. EUR) then had been declining quite sharply in two 
following years to less than 4000 mil. EUR. In period 2002 – 2005 remained relatively 
still and has begun to rise during 2006 till now. The most of the amount of loans 
belongs to nonfinancial corporations and the rest is divided between financial corp. 
and government institutions. The really interesting is, that in comparison with other 
countries, especially Poland and Hungary, the amount of loans belonging to 
households was and still is minimal. 
The share of FX loans to total loans (domestic and foreign currency) exhibits 
the cyclical pattern too, is currently lowest from all V4 countries and does not show 
strong tendencies to grow. 
The net position of residents (computed simply as FX deposits net of FX 
loans) is also favorable. Till year 2001 it was negative, implying, that residents 
liabilities (loans) were larger than assets (deposits). The positive trend from year 
1999 corresponds with declining of FX loans amount happening during the same 
period. The FX deposits contribute to this only slightly, since they have been growing 
from 1997 at very moderate pace. 
3.1.2. Slovakia 
As we can see from Fig. 3.1, from 2002, since the data are available, the FX 
loans have been experiencing quite significant growth. The structure of loans is very 
similar to that in Czech republic, that means, that the largest portion of total amount 
belongs to nonfinancial corporations, and the rest to government and financial 
corporations. The loans of households seem to have been expanding for last two 
years, but still it is nothing, compared with Poland and Hungary. 
The FX loans / total loans ratio is, unfortunately, available only for period 2005 
– 2007, so changes in this indicator seem large and volatile, but, because of short 
period, this is misleading perception. But we can see, that currently the value of this 
indicator hovers slightly above 20 %, which is almost two times more than in Czech 
republic, but much less than in Hungary. 
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 Usage of interest differentials could be better, but due to data availability and compatibility 
problems, it was not possible to construct them. Therefore, only FX loans’ interest rates are used, 
serving as some kind of proxy. 
12
 A warning is in order: Since the time series have different lengths, one has to examine and 
compare the graphs of countries carefully! 
The net position of Slovakia’s residents exhibits cyclical pattern, however, it 
seem, that it tends to be very low, which is good. 
3.1.3. Hungary 
From glimpse look on the Figures, one may see, that situation in Hungary is 
completely different from two cases described above. 
First, when we look at the loans sector compositions, the development of 
amount of FX loans provided to households in last 3 year is striking. Compared with 
Czech republic or Slovakia, the amount of households’ FX loans is simply huge and 
may put a lot of households in danger in case of unfavorable economic situation 
(exchange rate depreciation, economic slowdown, etc.), as well as (consequently) 
banks. 
Second, the total amount of FX loans is large, it reaches almost 26 000 mil. 
EUR. 
Third, the share of FX loans to total loans reaches nearly 50 %. And looking at 
Fig. 3.3, one can see that residents’ net position is negative for whole observed 
period and tends to increase further. 
3.1.4. Poland 
Looking at this country’s structure of FX loans, we can see some similarity with 
Hungary. Here is the share of households’ FX loans even bigger (and recently 
growing) than in Hungary. The total amount of FX loans slightly exceeds 25 000 mil. 
EUR.  
The ratio of loan dollarization exhibits some sort of cyclical pattern, currently 
stands at 26 % of total loans. Together with Hungary, these two countries show not 
only growth of FX loans amount, but also the FX loans / total loans ratio has been 
(with some swings) growing steady. 
The net position figure shows cyclical pattern, however, with downwarding 
trend. Again, only Hungary and Poland show negative and further downward going 
development of this indicator. 
3.1.5. Summary 
From what we have seen, we can distinct V4 countries to 2 groups. First group 
consists of Hungary and Poland and second of Czech republic and Slovakia. The 
possible future problems may arise in the first group. The share of FX loans to total 
loans is quite high (especially in Hungary) and has been growing for a long time. The 
volume of FX loans is also much higher in these two countries, in comparison with 
Czech republic and Slovakia. Also, the amount of FX loans provided to households is 
huge in comparison with Czech republic and Slovakia. It seems that residents of 
these two countries really and in the long term lean towards FX loans. But why is 
that? Is it due to relatively high inflation, or quite unstable (and for last 2 year 
depreciating in case of Hungary) exchange rate (NEER)? We will try to find out by 
conducting simple regression in the next section. 
Fig. 3.1 Foreign exchange loans structure in V4 countries 
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Source: National central banks, own computations. 
Fig. 3.2 Foreign exchange loans to total loans ratio in V4 countries 
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Fig. 3.3 Net position of residents in V4 countries 
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Source: National central banks, own computations. 
3.2. What factors has influenced the loan dollarization? 
In this section, we present results of OLS regression, which were done for 
each country separately. The functional form (2) is showed in section 2.2., which is: 
DLOGFLt = α1t + α2t*DLOGFDt + α3t*DLOGINFt + α4t*DLOGNEERt + α5t*DLOGIRt + εt.  
All models were tested for: autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, ARCH effect 
and normality distribution of residuals. All presented results in Tab. 3.1 are valid in 
terms of aforementioned tests, unless it is said otherwise. 
Tab. 3. 1 Result of V4 countries regressions1) 
 Czech republic2) Slovakia Poland Hungary 
α1 
(constant) 
-0,001 
(0,940) 
0,031* 
(0,003) 
0,012* 
(0,008) 
0,018* 
(0,001) 
DLOGFD 0,023 
(0,850) 
0,056 
(0,523) 
0,026 
(0,603) 
0,115*** 
(0,052) 
DLOGINF -0,004 
(0,690) 
-0,094 
(0,184) 
-0,016 
(0,490) 
0,038 
(0,121) 
DLOGNEER -0,340 
(0,160) 
-0,884 
(0,360) 
-1,256* 
(0,000) 
-1,221* 
(0,001) 
DLOGIR -0,126** 
(0,041) 
-0,932** 
(0,020) 
0,002 
(0,985) 
-0,516* 
(0,001) 
R2 0,19 0,34 0,49 0,44 
Adj. R2 0,11 0,19 0,42 0,32 
* - results valid at 1 % level of significance, ** - results valid at 5 % level of significance, *** - 
results valid at 10 % level of significance. 
1)
 Probability values in parentheses. 
2)
 To account for serial correlation, model was adjusted by implementing AR(1) process of 
residuals. 
So, what are the results telling to us? In case of Czech republic, the chosen 
model is not very good. Explaining power is very weak, as suggest R2 or  
Adj. R2. From all introduced variables, only FX loans’ interest rate seems to be 
statistically significant, suggesting that interest rate has played some role in agents’ 
decision making, whether to take FX or domestic currency loans. Thus, for this 
country we can conclude, that better model should be developed, either in terms of 
some other variables or in terms of different functional form, to capture factors, which 
have influenced the FX loans development. 
For Slovakia we can make a very similar conclusion. Putting aside statistically 
significant constant, only FX loans’ interest rates seem to have influenced the FX 
loans development. Moreover, again, the Adj. R2 is quite low, suggesting possibly 
weak explaining power of chosen model. 
Model for Poland yields much better results. Explaining power is sufficient, 
difference between R2 and Adj. R2 is negligible. It seems, that from selected 
variables, the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) has played crucial role in 
determining FX loans development. 
Also for Hungary the model seems to be fitted quite well. In case of this 
country, foreign deposits (FD), NEER and interest rate were important in influencing 
FX loans. NEER and interest rate are both highly statistically significant (at 1% level), 
FD is significant at 10 % level, which is still acceptable. Also, the explaining power of 
model seems to be good enough. 
Conclusion 
De facto dollarization is phenomenon, which is really widespread. One of its 
form, financial, may pose a threat to emerging or developing economies through 
excessive providing foreign exchange loans to residents, especially households. In 
case of some economical problems, lot of them may become unable to service their 
debts, since their income is mostly denominated in domestic currency, but their 
liabilities (loans) are not. Problems of debtors may consequently cause problems to 
creditors (banks) and endanger the stability of banking sector. 
In this paper, we have chosen to examine the structure and development of 
foreign exchange loans in V4 countries. Also, we tried to find out, which of arbitrarily 
selected factors have contributed to foreign exchange loans development by 
conducting simple OLS regression for each country. 
We found out, that Poland and especially Hungary may be endangered in 
future, because not only the loan dollarization level is quite high and rising, but 
currently, roughly almost half of all foreign currency loans is provided to households 
in case of Hungary. Also the share of foreign currency loans to total loans is 
especially in Hungary very high and from the long-term point of view still rising. On 
the other hand, the situation in Czech republic and Slovakia is quite favorable. The 
share of foreign exchange loans to total loans is low and shows no signs of sharp 
rising. The structure is also good, since most of these loans are divided between 
nonfinancial, financial corporations and government, who should not be endangered 
in case of some economical problems as easily as households. 
Talking about regression results, they are rather mixed. As one could expect 
from analysis of time series data done above, the one kind of model will not fit to all 
countries. In case of Czech republic and partly Slovakia the model results were poor, 
suggesting possible influence of foreign currency loans’ interest rate. In case of 
Poland and Hungary the results were much better. The model seems to be 
reasonably good for capturing effect of chosen variables, especially in case of 
Hungary. While in Poland the significant effect may be assigned to nominal exchange 
rate (NEER), in Hungary played significant role NEER, foreign exchange loans’ 
interest rates and foreign deposits. 
The challenges for future research seem clear. Developing another, more 
suitable model for Czech republic, introducing some other variables with more 
explaining power and increasing the number of examined countries. It would be 
interesting to extend research scope for all new member EU countries, which are not 
members of Eurozone. However, the data accessibility and compatibility may be a 
problem. 
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